This Article explores the marginalization of two groups of employees-individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities.
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B. Special-Treatment Stigma
Because individuals with disabilities and workers with children or other caregiving responsibilities cannot conform to the ideal-worker norm, both groups suffer from special-treatment stigma. 43 Special-treatment stigma manifests itself in two distinct but related ways. First, the requirement to provide special accommodations to individuals in the workplace makes an employer believe (sometimes correctly) that employing such individuals is more expensive and burdensome than employing other individuals. 44 This belief, in turn, causes an employer to be reluctant to hire and promote these individuals. 45 Second, the provision of special accommodations to certain individuals in the workplace fosters the resentment of coworkers who believe (again, sometimes correctly) that they have to carry a larger burden to help *1109 accommodate the employee or that the employee who receives the accommodation or "special treatment" 46 is getting an unfair (and perhaps undeserved) 47 advantage. 48 The next two subsections discuss each of these in turn.
Employers' Reluctance to Hire and Accommodate
One common bond between individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities is the way employers treat (or more accurately, mistreat) both groups. In the eyes of most employers, all accommodations are deemed equal, or in most cases, equally bad. 49 Employers often see proposals for special treatment as evidence that those employees "just can't cut it" in the workplace. 50 Despite their legal obligation, employers often appear no more willing to provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities than they are to provide accommodations or special treatment to caregivers or other workers who need some kind of special treatment or accommodation from the regular rules of the workplace. 51 In fact, employers are often willing to provide informal accommodations to an employee until and unless the employee requests an accommodation that signals a possible legal obligation. 52 For instance, in Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 53 in *1110 her attempt to prove that the employer discriminated against her because of her pregnancy, the plaintiff pointed to the fact that before her pregnancy, other employees assisted her in performing her more strenuous job duties, but after she became pregnant and asked for the same assistance, the employer refused. 54 The court stated that there was a material difference between requesting and receiving assistance from other employees and forcing those employees to give assistance if needed as an accommodation.
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The former, the court said, "was completely voluntary and given in a spirit of teamwork" but if the employer granted the plaintiff the accommodation, the assistance by the coworkers would be obligatory. 56 Further evidence that employers dislike having to provide accommodations is the fact that the ADA has not noticeably improved the employment of individuals with disabilities. 57 Many argue that the reason for this is because employers are resistant to providing accommodations to individuals with disabilities 58 so they simply do not hire them. 59 As most employment lawyers know, it is far easier for an employer to defend a failure to hire claim than it is to defend a termination claim. 60 Therefore,
anything that arguably increases the *1111 costs of employing an individual 61 or makes it more difficult for an employer to fire an employee might incentivize an employer to not hire the individual in the first place. 
Resentment by Coworkers
Coworkers are often resentful when employers allow individuals with disabilities or workers with caregiving responsibilities to deviate from the normal workplace rules or give them any other kind of special treatment. 63 One reason for this resentment is that workplace rules are often very rigid so that any deviation is seen as unfair special treatment to the employee who receives the "benefit." 64 Coworkers resent that others get a benefit that they do not. 65 These employees might also resent the fact that employers might require them to work harder or *1112 longer or to vary their working hours in order to accommodate individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. 66 The accommodations that are alleged to benefit employees with disabilities at the expense of others include: "job restructuring, providing part-time or . . . modified work schedules, allowing leaves of absence, and reassigning individuals with disabilities to open positions." 67 In all of these cases, the accommodation would have some effect on other employees. Job restructuring, for example, might require other employees to perform tasks that a disabled employee cannot perform because of his disability. Part-time or modified work schedules and leaves of absence could require other employees to work longer or different hours to make up for the absences of the disabled or caregiving coworker. Finally, reassigning individuals with disabilities to other positions can cause conflicts with nondisabled coworkers who might also be interested in those positions and have either more seniority or superior qualifications for the position. 68 In reality, some of this resentment is unwarranted because courts often hold that employers are not obligated to accommodate employees if doing so would require other employees to work harder or longer. 69 As Professor Travis states, "[I]n most accommodation cases the ADA's accommodation mandate does not benefit individuals with disabilities at the expense of their nondisabled coworkers." 70 The most common types *1113 of accommodations-such as making the building more accessible, or providing modifications to work equipment-do not negatively affect other employees. 71 She recognizes, as do I, that some might think that the overall costs of accommodations negatively affect coworkers indirectly because money is being spent on accommodations that could be spent on compensation or benefits for the rest of the workforce. 72 However, as noted by Travis:
"[E]mpirical research has found that the costs of most accommodations are minimal or may even provide employers net longterm economic gains." 73 While some accommodations place some burdens on coworkers to take on some additional tasks, those tasks are usually "marginal" tasks and do not place any unreasonable burden on other employees. 74 Nevertheless, employers' decisions to not accommodate employees are often due to a fear that coworkers will feel that the employer is treating them unfairly when the employer gives accommodations to employees with disabilities. Courts share this concern about the resentment of coworkers. For instance, in the first ADA reasonable accommodation case the Supreme Court decided, 75 the employee with the disability, Robert Barnett, was allowed to transfer into a mailroom position once he became disabled due to a back injury that prevented him from performing his duties as a cargo handler. 76 After Barnett served in this position for two years, the employer opened it up for seniority bidding and two employees with more seniority than Barnett bid on the mailroom position. 77 I suspect that the employees were willing to bid on this position (even knowing it would likely cause Barnett's termination) because they resented the fact that Barnett was allowed to have this physically less-strenuous position in the first place. It appears that the Court was also concerned about this perceived unfairness. 78 Other reasonable accommodation cases similarly imply that coworkers are resentful of accommodations employers give to disabled employees if the coworkers perceive those accommodations as *1114 negatively affecting other employees. 79 In the caregiving context, scholars argue that accommodating caregivers is likely to create tensions between those caregivers and their coworkers. 80 The argument is that accommodating caregivers bestows undue privileges on parents, yet holds nonparents to higher performance standards. 81 Many studies indicate that employees without primary caregiving responsibilities express a desire to work fewer hours like their caregiving counterparts 82 and express resentment that only the caregiving employees are allowed the opportunity to work reduced hours. 83 Many of us have also heard anecdotal stories regarding coworkers' resentment when workers with caregiving responsibilities must leave work early or are not expected to come in on the weekends, leaving the non-caregivers to pick up the slack for their caregiving coworkers. 84 To be fair, not all workplaces involve resentful coworkers. There are examples of workplaces that are infused with a communitarian spirit. 85 In the disability context, the case of Miller v. Illinois Department of Transportation 86 is a good example. The plaintiff was assigned to a bridge crew as a highway maintainer, along with four other highway maintainers and a bridge technician. 87 Miller had occasional difficulty working from heights, especially when he was unsecured. 88 He was not officially diagnosed with acrophobia, but he did tell his supervisor that he had a fear of heights and that he would be unable to perform some of the work, such as walking a bridge beam. 89 Despite his fear, he was able to work at heights if he was enclosed, and he estimated his fear kept him *1115 from performing only three percent of his job duties. 90 In a similar case in the pregnancy context, Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 93 the plaintiff was hired as an activity director in a nursing home. 94 Some of her many duties were physically strenuous, including rearranging dining room tables and pushing patients in wheelchairs. 95 Even before the plaintiff became pregnant, other employees voluntarily helped the plaintiff with these more strenuous functions. 96 Shortly after the plaintiff became pregnant, she began to have complications, and in order to avoid a second miscarriage, her doctor ordered her to avoid all strenuous activities. 97 These restrictions meant that she was unable to perform a few of the physically strenuous functions mentioned above. 98 Because the company allowed accommodations only for individuals with disabilities or employees who suffered workplace injuries, the employer told the plaintiff that she had to return with no restrictions at all or she would be fired. 99 Her doctor insisted on the restrictions to prevent a miscarriage, and her employer terminated her. 100 This case demonstrates that even when employees are willing to help out a coworker, employers might nevertheless refuse the accommodation, presumably because they fear later resentment should the coworkers eventually tire of providing the assistance.
Other than this limited entitlement to leave under the FMLA, there is no legal protection for workers with caregiving responsibilities. 117 There *1119 is limited protection for pregnant employees under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
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The PDA is an amendment to the definition section of Title VII. 119 It simply states that the terms used in Title VII, "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include:
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .
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Thus, the PDA protects only women who are pregnant or recovering from childbirth and leaves women (and caregiving men) without coverage for the rest of their child's life. 121 Moreover, the PDA requires an employer to treat pregnant employees only as the employer would treat other employees who experience a similar inability to work. 122 Thus, if a small employer not covered by the FMLA does not provide leaves of absence for short-term illnesses or injuries, the employer is not required to provide any leave at all for a pregnant woman who just gave birth. 123 Many employers give a pregnant woman only one or two weeks to recover from childbirth before the employer expects her to be back to work. 124 In sum, the law entitles individuals with disabilities to much greater protection than workers with caregiving responsibilities.
B. Justifying These Differences?
This section explores all of the reasons that are given or could be given to justify different (better) treatment of individuals with disabilities from workers with caregiving responsibilities. This section will also explore the limitations of those justifications and argue that the differences are not, in fact, justified.
*1120
To state it simply (no doubt too simply), the primary reason why Congress requires employers to provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities but not to caregivers is because providing accommodations to disabled individuals is more politically palatable than providing accommodations to workers to fulfill their caregiving responsibilities. But why is that the case? This section explores that question.
Conservatives and the Private Sphere
One reason legislators might be more willing to mandate workplace accommodations to individuals with disabilities than to workers with caregiving responsibilities is because some legislators see caregiving as part of the private sphere and not the public sphere. 125 This public/private dichotomy may lead to two conclusions. First, caregiving's locus in the private sphere means that government should not provide support for it. In other words, families are responsible for caring for their own children. Second, its location in the private sphere also means that some people believe that women should be home with their families rather than at work, 126 or if they are at work, then they should work in flexible part-time jobs, allowing ample time for caregiving. Thus, those who believe in the public/private dichotomy might not support measures that make it easier for women with children to work.
Of course, as many scholars argue, the public/private dichotomy is a false one. 127 Because we all benefit from the caregiving that caregivers perform, we all should help caregivers succeed. 128 Furthermore, to the extent that conservatives might prefer that women with children work in part-time or flexible jobs, such a choice is likely to lead to the serious marginalization of those women's careers. For the most part, the only types of jobs that are part-time, very flexible, or both are usually dead-end jobs with no challenge, no opportunity for advancement, and no benefits. 129 This might not be a problem for mothers who have husbands *1121 who are the primary earners, 130 but it is a problem for the millions of women (and men) who are either an equal or primary earner in a dual-earner household or are the sole breadwinner. 131 In these cases, not giving these workers accommodations to manage their caregiving responsibilities often leads to severe consequences such as unemployment or harm to their children. 132 2. The Goal of Independence Under the ADA Another reason that legislators favored an accommodation mandate for individuals with disabilities was because they believed that the ADA fostered the independence of individuals with disabilities. 133 If more individuals with disabilities had employment opportunities (which would presumably be easier with the passage of the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision) then these individuals would not have to rely on government-funded support. 134 Some argue it was the disability rights movement's emphasis on the goal of independence that contributed significantly to the enactment of the ADA. 135 This is not to say that everyone supports the use of the independence goal as justification for disability rights legislation; in fact, there are problems with relying on this goal. For one, citing independence and efficiency as reasons for disabilityrights legislation can "detract from the purpose of . . . guaranteeing equal access to society through equal protection and due process." 136 Moreover, as Professor Bagenstos notes, many individuals with disabilities who claim to seek "independence"
and "self-reliance" must "rely significantly on assistance from third parties," such as courts to enforce their rights, employers to provide *1122 workplace accommodations, and other institutions to make structures and services accessible. 137 Despite this criticism, there is ample evidence that independence was at least one of the goals of the ADA.
Yet, one can see why this same goal did not lead to accommodations for caregiving employees. It is assumed that workers with caregiving responsibilities do not need the legal protection of accommodations to keep them independent and off public benefits 138 because, it is assumed, most caregivers are women who have spouses to support them if they either lose their job or they must take a low-paying, part-time position that affords necessary flexibility. 139 Of course that assumption does not always, or even often, reflect reality. Many caregivers are either the primary breadwinners or single parents. 140 In fact, some even argue that providing protection to women with caregiving responsibilities will help women achieve the independence they need to live a full, rewarding life, one in which they do not have to depend on men for their livelihood. 141 Yet the perception of caregivers as women who can depend on the income of their spouses is a hard one to dispel.
*1123 3. The Numbers Problem
The willingness to provide an accommodation mandate to individuals with disabilities but not caregivers might also be based on the perception of the relative size of the protected groups. The preamble to the ADA before the 2008 amendments described individuals with disabilities as a "discrete and insular minority" 142 and subsequent Supreme Court opinions reinforced that view. 143 However, the ADA Amendments Act makes this a much more difficult proposition to support. 144 Because it is now infinitely easier to fall under the coverage of the ADA, the number of individuals who could be considered disabled under the Act has expanded dramatically. 145 The fact that a condition occurs in a significant portion of the population is no longer a viable justification for its exclusion from the ADA's protected class. 146 "The ADA now includes virtually all persons diagnosed with diabetes, 8.3 percent of the U.S. population, and also likely includes many persons with hypertension, who comprise up to 31.3 percent of the U.S. population." 147 Although it is likely that workers with primary caregiving responsibilities still outnumber those individuals who could be considered disabled under the ADA, the disparity is not nearly as significant as it was before the ADA was amended.
*1124 4. The Rhetoric of Choice
Another justification given for treating individuals with disabilities more favorably than individuals with caregiving responsibilities is the rhetoric of choice. Most people view most disabilities as immutable and not the fault of the individual with the disability, 148 whereas most people see caregiving decisions as voluntarily made and most often desired. 149 Hence, there is a willingness to provide additional protection (in the form of accommodations) to employees with disabilities because those employees have no choice regarding their disability, 150 but we disfavor accommodations for workers with caregiving responsibilities who presumably chose their status as caregivers and therefore should live with the consequences. 151 As discussed below, this distinction, once unpacked, does not stand up to scrutiny.
a. Some Disabilities Are Caused by Voluntary Actions
Even though the immutability and sometimes-genetic basis may have influenced Congress when passing the ADA, the case law and the reactions of employers and coworkers indicate that some believe that voluntary lifestyle decisions cause certain disabilities. When courts and employers believe an impairment is caused by lifestyle choices, they are less sympathetic. For instance, the media backlash against the ADA focused on impairments that the public views as particularly undeserving precisely because the public perceives their cause to be voluntary actions-e.g., obesity, substance abuse, and alcoholism. 152 Courts and employers are also skeptical of calling diabetes, high blood *1125 pressure, and sometimes even cancer disabilities, perhaps because all of these impairments may have a lifestyle-contributing factor. 153 Of course, there are some lifestyle choices that cause disabilities that are not disfavored or stigmatized. For example, imagine an employee becomes disabled after a skiing accident. Even though the employee made a "choice" to engage in a potentially risky activity (and maybe even a choice to ski recklessly), it is not an activity that is disfavored in our society (such as, perhaps, the use of illegal drugs) and employees would likely be more willing to support accommodations provided to the employee disabled from a skiing accident than to an employee who has diabetes because he is overweight or an employee who gets lung cancer because he smokes. Thus, relying on the concept of immutability to justify the provision of greater protection for individuals with disabilities does not make much sense. 159 In other words, even when the decision to become a parent is voluntary, "raising them well is not-it is a responsibility." 160 As I discussed in prior work, 161 not only is caregiving a responsibility, but it is a responsibility that benefits all of society. 162 The value of caregiving is an idea many communitarians emphasize-they argue that "parents have a moral responsibility to
[their] community to invest themselves in the proper upbringing of their children." 163 Other scholars agree. 164 As Professor Laura Kessler states, "[C]aregiving work is fundamental to the functioning of society, the continuation of the human race, and the living of a full life." 165 Understanding the importance of caregiving-not just for the parents who raise the children, but for the rest of society-helps us understand how the focus on the "choices" parents make is flawed. 166 Caregiving is not simply a choice. It is a responsibility.
Similarly, a caregiver's "choice" to care for an adult family member who is elderly, sick, or disabled is also a responsibility. 167 This caregiving responsibility is often less of a "free choice" than the decision to have children. 168 We do not choose our parents and we *1127 cannot control (or even always anticipate) when a family member is going to become ill or need care. 169 "The only 'choice' that might be made in this regard" is which family member is going to care for a loved one. 170 "In many families, there is no choice." 171 "One spouse must care for the other." 172 One adult daughter might be the only family member living near her parent when that parent needs care. Accordingly, while it is true that reliance on the concept of choice likely influences the difference in the law's and employers' treatment of individuals with disabilities and women with caregiving responsibilities, that reliance is misplaced.
Stigma
Another factor that differentiates some individuals with disabilities from women with caregiving responsibilities is stigma.
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I use "stigma" here to mean something different than the stigma that I refer to in my concept of "special-treatment stigma." The latter phrase refers to the resentment coworkers feel when they believe (correctly or not) that another employee receives special treatment in the workplace. The other use of the word "stigma" refers to the negative reactions about individuals' physical attributes, appearance, or behavior, unrelated to their work habits. 174 Or, stated simply, I refer to stigma's ordinary definition:
"a mark of disgrace associated with a particular circumstance, quality, or person." 175 Although this varies greatly *1128 depending on the particular disability, 176 it is quite obvious that there is greater stigma associated with most disabilities 177 than with being a caregiver. The statutory findings of the ADA reference this stigma. 178 The findings note that individuals with disabilities have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment"; that society has tended to "isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities"; and that continued discrimination is a "serious and pervasive social problem." 179 The
ADA findings "support the notion that disability is a condition marked by . . . subordination and second-class citizenship." 180 The stigma that faces individuals with disabilities is well documented. 181 Many believe that the major problem individuals with disabilities face is learning to deal with the stigma that surrounds their disabilities. 182 Many view people with disabilities as "less than human," 183 and society often responds to individuals with disabilities with "pity, fear, and quite often repulsion." 184 Furthermore, when doctors treat disability as a medical condition, it stigmatizes individuals labeled as disabled "by defining them as something less than normal." 185 Because it is assumed that many individuals with disabilities are unable to support themselves through gainful employment, many in society view individuals with disabilities as inadequate and as "sapping the strength of the country when unable to produce financially." 186 Finally, individuals with disabilities are often deprived of opportunities because of generalizations made about the limitations their disabilities cause. 187 Although workers with caregiving responsibilities are unlikely to experience stigma in the sense of pity, fear, and repulsion, they do *1129 experience stigma in the sense that employers and coworkers might discount their competence and dedication to the job. 188 There is a wealth of work/life scholarship that explores the stereotypical assumptions made about workers with caregiving responsibilities. 189 Even when caregiving does not interfere with an employee's ability to perform her job as an "ideal worker," stereotypes still negatively affect her. 190 For instance, one study that involved caregivers in the workplace compared women on two axes: "competence" and "warmth." 191 The study rated career women high in competence but low in warmth. 192 In contrast, the study rated housewives high in warmth but low in competence, similar to "the blind, disabled, retarded, and elderly." 193 A couple of cases further demonstrate how employers make discriminatory decisions "based on stereotypical beliefs, rather than reality." 194 In one case, the plaintiff "was told by her supervisors that it was not possible to do her job with little children at home." 195 Thus, "[s]he was denied tenure based on the assumption that she would not continue to work hard once she obtained tenure." 196 In another case, the plaintiff was a successful sales person who repeatedly demonstrated a desire to be promoted. 197 Her supervisor denied her promotion to a managerial position on the *1130 erroneous belief that, because she had children, she would not be willing to move. 198 Men who are primary caregivers also suffer from stigma associated with their caregiving. To some extent, this stigma is even more pronounced because it is not simply based on erroneous perceptions of competency and dedication. It is also based on assumptions about the proper gender roles of men and women. 199 As Professor Joan Williams states, "working-class menlike higher-status ones-recognize the stigma triggered when men signal their involvement in family care . . . . [and] this stigma can be severe." 200 I recognize that it is difficult to compare the stigma individuals with disabilities might experience, which includes pity and possibly revulsion, with the stigma caregivers in the workplace experience. I think most people would agree that the stigma individuals with disabilities experience is much worse than any stigma workers with caregiving responsibilities experience, and that this difference, therefore, justifies different treatment of individuals with disabilities. In fact, many courts and scholars point to the stigma of individuals with disabilities as a major impetus for and justification of the ADA. 201 However, although the stigma experienced justifies protection against outright discrimination and exclusion, 202 it does not necessarily explain the reasonable accommodation provision. 203 Some argue that, if an employer refuses to give a disabled employee an accommodation, it is not stigma that influenced that decision, but rather the reality that the *1131 disability requires special treatment and the reluctance to provide that special treatment. 204 Thus, even though many disabilities admittedly lead to more stigma than that which faces workers with caregiving responsibilities, the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate could handle that additional stigma. Therefore, the additional stigma does not explain the additional benefit of the accommodation mandate for individuals with disabilities.
In sum, there are certainly differences between individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. But the experiences they share-the mutual marginalization they experience caused by special-treatment stigma in the workplaceare more significant than the differences between the groups. Accordingly, for both groups, we must find a way to end the marginalization by ending special-treatment stigma. The next Part will explore that goal.
III. Ending Mutual Marginalization
Because, as this Article argues, special-treatment stigma is the common link between individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities, this Part will explore how we can end, or at least minimize, the special-treatment stigma both groups experience in the workplace. This Part explores three alternatives. First, recognizing that the special treatment inherent in providing accommodations causes the stigma, some might argue that we should stop accommodating both groups and allow employers to voluntarily accommodate as they see fit. The second alternative is to rid the stigma of special treatment and accommodate all employees through a universal accommodation mandate. The third alternative would be to accommodate both individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities (but not everyone) and to find a way to justify this special treatment. This Part ultimately advocates in favor of this last alternative, and argues that the communitarian theory provides the justification for the special treatment of accommodations.
A. No Special Treatment
If the special treatment inherent in providing accommodations causes a backlash against individuals with disabilities, then the simplest response is to stop accommodating individuals with disabilities. Of course, without accommodations, many individuals with disabilities would not be able to work at all; many would not be able to work in a job that uses their abilities and skills to their maximum potential; and many individuals with disabilities would lose their jobs because of their *1132 failure to conform to the ideal-worker norm of the workplace. 205 As discussed earlier, Congress included a reasonable accommodation provision in the ADA in part to increase the independence of individuals with disabilities, allowing them to support themselves through work rather than depending on government support. 206 If employers no longer had a legal obligation to accommodate individuals with disabilities, employers would refuse to hire, terminate, or otherwise marginalize through dead-end jobs many of those individuals.
One argument in response to this is that employers always accommodated individuals with disabilities even without a legal obligation to do so and would continue to do so, just as they sometimes accommodate caregiving obligations. As Professor Arnow-Richman argues, many employers accommodate caregiving through formal policies (leaves of absence or various forms of flexibility) or through more informal mechanisms. 207 She argues that an employer might see providing accommodations to workers with caregiving responsibilities as a "good personnel policy, hoping its decision will yield enhanced productivity, better workplace morale, or reduced turnover." 208 However, other studies reveal a less flexible workplace. 209 Especially among blue-collar occupations, many employers do not offer much flexibility at all. 210 Some employers have very strict no-fault attendance policies, where six or eight absences (or late arrivals) in a year will result in termination, regardless of the reason for the absence. 211 Lower-income workers are much less likely to receive the protections of the *1133 FMLA, 212 and even if they qualify for leave under the FMLA, they often cannot afford to take it. 213 For many reasons-including employers' lack of information about the business case for providing flexibility benefits-the majority of employers will not, to any great extent, voluntarily offer flexible workplaces to the majority of their employees. 214 Thus, without an accommodation mandate, many individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities will continue to be marginalized.
B. Universal Accommodation
If our goal is to avoid special-treatment stigma, one option to explore is a universal accommodation mandate. If all employees had the right to have employers accommodate their workplace needs, there would no longer be a need for any special treatment. Thus, it might make sense to explore a universal solution to what is increasingly becoming a universal problem-workers often need variations from the strict workplace norms that have been entrenched in our society for decades. 215 And because singling out certain groups for special treatment contributed to the backlash against individuals with *1134 disabilities and caregivers, perhaps the way to get rid of that backlash is to have a system of universal accommodation.
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A universal accommodation mandate would be an extension of a universally applicable process law, similar to the interactive process under the ADA. 217 Several scholars discuss implementing a "process" law 218 for caregivers, and such a bill has been proposed in Congress. 219 The basic premise of such a law would be to "allow an employee to request workplace flexibility from his or her employer and would prohibit employers from discriminating or retaliating against employees for making these requests." 220 "[E]mployers would be required to consider the employee's request and, within a reasonable period of time, accept or reject the employee's request." 221 "If the request [were] rejected, the employer would have to give a reason for the rejection." 222 As Arnow-Richman states, the purpose of such a law is to encourage compliance with the interactive process "with the hopes that good *1135 process can lead to voluntary accommodation." 223 However, under such a process law, if the employer rejects the request, the reason given is not subject to scrutiny as to whether or not the accommodation requested was truly feasible. 224 But an accommodation mandate would change that. It would allow an employer to refuse a requested accommodation only if the accommodation was unreasonable or it would create an undue hardship for the employer. 225 And unlike a universal process rule, which is limited to requests for flexible schedule accommodations, a true universal accommodation mandate would allow employees to seek accommodations if they need a variation from the normal workplace schedule or if they need assistance with or modifications to the physical tasks of a particular job.
There are several benefits to a universal accommodation mandate. One benefit is that it would alleviate some of the decisionmaking problems employers face. For instance, some employers have strict attendance policies and enforce those policies in a draconian manner, in part because they want to avoid making decisions that a court could later find unjust (in the union context) 226 or even discriminatory. Unions even sometimes oppose flexibility because they do not want employers to have too much discretion-they view uniform rules as the only way to limit employers' power. 227 But if a universal accommodation mandate required flexibility, it would take some of the decision-making out of the hands of employers. While many would object to such a loss of business autonomy, the benefit is that employers would have less of a risk of applying the rules inconsistently, where such inconsistency could lead to legal liability. 228 On a more practical level, managers and human resources personnel might appreciate not having to make distinctions between what they perceive to be equally compelling reasons for *1136 needing accommodations from the normal workplace demands. 229 Of course, the primary benefit of a universal accommodation mandate is that it would lessen the special-treatment stigma that providing accommodations to only certain groups of employees causes. If all employees had access to accommodations from the normal workplace demands, there would be no "special treatment" to stigmatize workers with disabilities and employees with caregiving responsibilities.
Despite these benefits, it is difficult to imagine drafting a workable universal accommodation proposal. Employers would be obligated to provide an accommodation, if reasonable, and if the accommodation did not create an undue hardship. Even though employers would not be allowed to judge the merits of the reason for the accommodation request, the employer would still need to determine whether the employee actually needs the accommodation. This is where confusing line-drawing takes place. What does it mean to need an accommodation? Is it based on the employee's subjective belief of what the employee needs? For instance, if an employee requests a waiver from performing mandatory clean-up duty at the end of the shift because the employee has an especially sensitive sense of smell and the odor of the cleaning materials bothers her, is this a need that the employer should accommodate? Certainly the mandate would require an employer to accommodate an employee who has an allergy or asthma that the cleaning materials exacerbate, but does that mean the employer should have to accommodate an employee who is bothered by a particular job task if performing the job task is not impossible or would not create any serious physical consequences? Does an employer have to accommodate an employee who asks to work a flex-time schedule through the winter, coming in earlier and leaving earlier, so that he can train for an upcoming marathon in the late afternoon before it is dark outside? These line-drawing difficulties would seemingly make a universal accommodation mandate almost impossible to implement and enforce. And even though the purpose of a universal accommodation mandate would be to eliminate much of employers' discretion, these examples demonstrate that there would still be some difficult discretionary decisions.
Furthermore, critics of such a proposal are likely, especially among disability rights advocates. For instance, Professor Bagenstos disagrees with proposals that treat the ADA as mandating a "universal regime of individualized accommodation." 230 Because he favors an interpretation *1137 of the ADA that would allow protection for only those whose impairments are "stigmatizing," he would not provide protection to someone who, for instance, has a broken leg and therefore cannot enter a particular building or who misses work because of the broken leg. 231 Other disability rights advocates might be concerned that allowing everyone to have individualized accommodations might lead to the denial of the accommodations of some individuals with disabilities. This is because the undue hardship defense looks at cumulative expenses, 232 so if an individual with a disability asks for a flexible start or end time, as an example, and the employer already granted that accommodation to other employees, it is possible that the accommodation for the individual with a disability would cause an undue hardship, and therefore the employer would deny the accommodation. 233 Another criticism of a universal accommodation mandate is likely to come from those who believe that proposals should give more weight to needs arising from disabilities and mandatory caregiving obligations than other reasons for requiring flexibility. 234 In other words, it is likely that the idea that all reasons for a requested accommodation are equally valid would offend both disability rights advocates and work/family *1138 advocates. Both groups would view the accommodation of disabilities or legitimate caregiving responsibilities as morally superior. 235 In the end, although I am not opposed to a universal accommodation mandate, I think the criticisms of it are more convincing than the arguments made in favor of it. One possibility that could accomplish the same result as the universal accommodation mandate without causing the same criticism is to change the structure of the workplace. Proposals such as reduced-hour workweeks for everyone have that as their goal. 236 In other words, instead of making each employee individually request an accommodation for a flexible starting and ending time, we could change the default norms of the workplace so that every employer simply offered to let every employee pick their own start and end time. Some progressive employers are doing just this. But mandating such a wholesale restructuring of the workplace is beyond the scope and imagination of this Article.
C. Justification for Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities and Caregivers
Most workers with caregiving responsibilities need accommodations from the normal workplace schedules and structures to avoid the marginalization that the inability to meet the ideal-worker norm causes. 237 Some caregivers need variable working hours on a regular basis. Some will miss work occasionally for reasons related to caregiving and will need exceptions to strict attendance policies. Some caregivers might need to work reduced hours. Some cannot work overtime. Some will be unable to travel.
*1139
Because the needs of workers with caregiving responsibilities are varied, several scholars explore the possibility of using an accommodation mandate 238 in the caregiving context. 239 It is easy to see the allure of requiring employers to provide accommodations to caregivers in the same way they provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities. As Professor Arnow-Richman states:
On its surface, the ADA embodies a commitment to accommodation that could revolutionize employers' treatment of caregivers if transported to that context. A statute that by its terms contemplates accommodation through job restructuring and modified work schedules could conceivably challenge features of work rooted in the "ideal worker" norm and demand employer flexibility in the areas that most disadvantage caregivers.
240
Despite the fact that a reasonable accommodation mandate for caregivers has some intuitive appeal, it does not enjoy widespread acceptance among work/family scholars. These scholars suggest that the ADA's accommodation mandate is not very successful 241 and some argue that it contributes to the backlash against the ADA. 242 Not only has the public, courts, and employers criticized the accommodation mandate, but it is also not very successful in significantly altering the "dominant work structures or norms." 243 Scholars argue that there appears to be no reason why an accommodation mandate would be *1140 more successful in the caregiving context; 244 it will likely lead to the same backlash against protections for caregivers as we currently see against the ADA, 245 perhaps even more so. Accordingly, its use in the caregiving context is seemingly doomed.
However, conceptualizing a way to eliminate the special-treatment stigma in the disability context might allow us to rethink an accommodation mandate in the caregiver context. Specifically, we need a theoretical justification for alleviating the resentment caused by the special treatment afforded to individuals with disabilities and the special treatment I propose employers give to caregivers.
In the remainder of this section, I argue that communitarian theory provides the justification we need to minimize the special-treatment stigma caused by providing accommodations to individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. This argument will proceed in four parts. First, I explain how communitarian theory emphasizes "a departure from a preoccupation with rights in favor of an emphasis on responsibility toward others." 246 The communitarian platform alleges that we have a responsibility to everyone in the communities to which we belong, 247 and the workplace is one such community. Second, many communitarians also believe that not only do we have a responsibility towards others in our communities, but that we all benefit when others in our community are successful and happy. Therefore, I demonstrate that there are significant benefits that the ADA bestows on nondisabled employees, which helps to justify the special treatment received by individuals with disabilities. Third, I argue that there are similar benefits to accommodating caregiving responsibilities that would help to minimize the special-treatment stigma facing workers with caregiving responsibilities. Finally, I discuss the logistics of an accommodation mandate for caregiving.
*1141 1. The Workplace Community
Communitarianism is "a set of ideas centered on the issues of community, moral education, and shared values." 248 It rests on the idea that we have a mutual responsibility to each other as citizens and that a stable community depends on this shared responsibility. 249 Thus, communitarian scholars criticize the absence of Americans' sense of obligation to one another: "It is as if we roam at large in a land of strangers, where we presumptively have no obligations toward others except to avoid the active infliction of harm." 250 The contemporary communitarian movement began in 1990 when a group of ethicists, social philosophers, and social scientists met to discuss the issues that harm our society. 251 One such issue was the troubling tendency of Americans to be quick to demand rights but reluctant to accept responsibilities. 252 Communitarians argue that rights come with responsibilities, 253 and not all responsibilities will lead to immediate benefits of rights. 254 Other scholars also emphasize the priority of duty over desires. 255 Although rights are important to communitarians, they are secondary to duty and responsibility. 256 Communitarians believe that "[r]ights alone do not make a good society." 257 Instead, they believe that *1142 our "preoccupation with rights has gone too far" and that a return to community can help to overcome some of the problems in America. 258 Instead of an emphasis on rights, the central value of communitarianism is belonging. 259 As one scholar states, communitarianism's "central doctrinal feature locates the essence of the human being in her relationship to others and to her community." 260 Communitarians' core values "entail concern for others and the commons we share." 261 Communitarians think that the community bears the responsibility for each individual member of the community. 262 As Etzioni states: "We adopted the name Communitarian to emphasize that the time has come to attend to our responsibilities to the conditions and elements we all share, to the community." 263 The communitarian theory supports accommodating individuals with disabilities and caregivers. The resentment nondisabled coworkers feel towards individuals who receive some type of special benefits in the workplace is evidence of an overemphasis on individual rights. Instead, if we all view the workplace as a community and understood ourselves as having a responsibility to others in our community, I believe much of the resentment coworkers feel would dissipate. 264 Our individual rights should not always trump what is best for the community, especially when employers can provide accommodations with a minimal burden on other employees. 265 The workplace community benefits from keeping disabled workers and caregiving workers employed. 266 Turnover is very expensive, both in terms of direct costs of replacing workers and the indirect costs of lost productivity. 267 Accommodating workers, both individuals with disabilities and those with caregiving responsibilities, allows those employees to remain employed, and thereby reduces attrition costs. 268 *1143
Employers also benefit because restructuring the status quo of workplace norms improves employee morale and loyalty and can make the workplace more productive and efficient.
269
Communitarian theory also emphasizes that we should consider what benefits society as a whole. 270 Society as a whole benefits when employers provide accommodations to disabled workers and workers with caregiving responsibilities. 271 Increases in the employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities and working caregivers decreases the chance that those individuals will rely on public assistance. 272 Nonetheless, communitarian theory does not demand that employers and coworkers be completely altruistic. Because communitarians believe in working together to reach a common goal or to better a community, we can also justify accommodations for both individuals with disabilities and caregiving workers by pointing to the more tangible benefits of employer mandates that grant "special treatment" to these groups of employees. In other words, special treatment is not just good for the group of employees who receive it; there are concrete benefits that extend to other employees in the workplace.
The ADA Benefits Nondisabled Employees
This subsection will demonstrate how the ADA affirmatively benefits nondisabled coworkers. 273 Professor Travis notes that although disability policy "ideally should be driven simply by the goals of equality and self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities, rather than by the majority's self-interest," there is a "practical importance of identifying benefits to nondisabled workers to help sustain continued support for the law." 274 I agree that emphasizing the benefits that the ADA provides to all employees can minimize the stigma of special treatment.
275
*1144 First and perhaps most importantly, "nondisabled employees should feel a stake in the ADA's future" because anyone might become disabled and "fall within the ADA's protected class" at any time. 276 In fact, as I argue elsewhere, this is even more true after the ADA Amendments Act in 2008 made it much easier to meet the definition of an individual with a disability. 277 As Travis aptly states, the "us" versus "them" mentality that caused the backlash against the ADA "is based on an incorrect assumption that the ADA protects only a small subset of workers." 278 In fact, one benefit of the expanded definition of disability under the Amendments is that an increase in the number of individuals entitled to protection will increase exposure to individuals with disabilities and possibly dissipate the fear and misunderstanding of individuals with disabilities. 279 As the ADA's reasonable accommodation provision entitles more individuals to protection, one hopes that accommodations can "become commonplace rather than special." 280 Even better, employers might begin to change the structure of the workplace and not rely on individual accommodations to a large number of employees. 281 But it is hard to get people to understand that they should support legislation that they might need someday, in part because people have a tendency to ignore the possibility of becoming *1145 ill, injured, or disabled. 282 Accordingly, Professor Travis outlines the other, more concrete benefits that the ADA provides to nondisabled individuals.
The first major way that the ADA helped nondisabled employees is that it increased the privacy protections for medical information in the workplace. 283 The ADA has very specific provisions regarding when employers can ask medical-related questions, how they can ask them, and what they can do with the information. 284 Even though the law is unclear regarding whether nondisabled individuals can sue for a violation of the ADA's privacy provisions, most employers simply no longer ask any invasive medical questions, regardless of whether an employee could sue under the Act. 285 As Travis states:
The real benefit to nondisabled employees has been that many employers simply have stopped subjecting them to sweeping medical inquiries. Prior to the ADA's enactment, employers often asked their employees about medical conditions, impairments, health histories, genetic information, prior workers' compensation claims, and prescription medication use.
286
Because most employers are averse to litigation, they do not ask questions that they routinely asked before Congress enacted the ADA.
Another benefit the ADA provides to nondisabled employees is what Travis calls "remedy spillover," where the employer changes the workplace to meet an accommodation demand or remedy an ADA claim and that change or remedy benefits others in the workplace. 287 For instance, some employees directly or indirectly benefit from the accommodations an employer gives to the disabled employee. Examples include: installing a ramp or elevator that is easier than stairs; ergonomic redesigns to offices or purchases of equipment that other employees can use to make lifting easier; higher cubicle dividers for an employee with a mental disability but that also help eliminate the distractions for other employees; a new air filter for an employee with severe asthma that improves the air quality for everyone; and other accommodations that might be experimental but that, if effective, will be useful for many nondisabled employees.
288
*1146 Caregiving employees in particular stand to benefit from the institutional changes to general workplace policies regarding when and where employees perform work. 289 As Travis argues, if an employer must accommodate an employee with a disability and provide flex time, job-sharing, changes in shifts or starting and ending times, the employer might realize that these changes can "decrease turnover . . . lower absenteeism, increase productivity," and help to recruit new employees.
290
If the ADA forces employers to accommodate disabled employees by changing the when, where, and how employees perform their job tasks, employers might realize that flexible arrangements are not nearly as disruptive as they believed them to be. 291 Travis also discusses how benefits to nondisabled employees could increase if more individuals with disabilities used disparate impact claims rather than failure to accommodate claims. 292 For most employees who believe that a workplace rule, policy, norm, or physical structure made them unable to perform the essential functions of their position, they can either fashion their claim as a "failure to accommodate" claim-where they are asking their employer for an individual variance or exception from the rule, policy, or norm, or a modification of the physical structure of the workforce-or they can fashion their claim as a disparate impact claim and allege that the employer's rule, policy, norm, or physical structure screens out or tends to screen out individuals with disabilities. 293 In a disparate impact claim, the remedy might be the elimination or modification of the discriminatory practice, which would positively affect other, nondisabled employees. 294 " [W] hile the ADA's accommodation mandate requires employers to only modify the workplace for the individual with a disability, the disparate impact theory may require an employer to modify a challenged practice for the entire workforce." 295 Although disparate impact claims under the ADA are not very common, 296 encouraging plaintiffs' attorneys to bring these claims on behalf of individuals with disabilities (instead of failure to accommodate claims) will possibly provide additional benefits to nondisabled employees.
Perhaps the most significant benefit nondisabled employees receive from the ADA is the spillover effect of the ADA's unique procedural *1147 process. Courts and the EEOC developed the concept of an "interactive process," where employers and employees with disabilities meet and discuss the employee's limitations, the essential functions of the job, and what accommodations might help the employee perform the essential functions of the job. 297 Even though the law requires employers to only engage in the interactive process with individuals with disabilities, 298 the reality is that lawyers advise many employers to engage in this interactive process even when the employer is uncertain that the employee has a disability protected under the statute. 299 Especially for those employers who are averse to litigation, it is more cost-effective "for employers to engage in the interactive process with all employees who request accommodations as a way . . . to insulate themselves from potential . . . liability." 300 Professor Stephen Befort calls the ADA's interactive process a "procedural revolution," 301 and
Travis describes the process as one where "human resource professionals have designed procedures to allow a wide range of employees to initiate meaningful conversations with their employers about their work environments." 302 As one employment attorney explains, it is often better to skip the determination of whether the employee has a disability and move directly to the determination of whether there is an accommodation that would keep the employee employed and allow him to return to his previous good performance. 303 In addition to avoiding litigation, it might make business sense for an employer to accommodate nondisabled employees if those accommodations would allow the employee to perform her job more efficiently or more easily. This is especially true given that "most accommodations cost very little and may even provide employers with a long-term net economic gain." 304 Finally, the interactive process allows employees to challenge the norms of the workplace, and in some cases educate employers that there is often more than one way to structure the workplace. 305 This is why many scholars recommend that we should take the lead from the ADA interactive process and adopt a process law to allow all employees to ask their employers for modifications to their work schedule and work environment without risking termination.
306
*1148 3. Accommodating Caregivers Also Benefits Non-Caregivers
Just as accommodating disabled employees benefits nondisabled employees, accommodating caregivers also benefits noncaregivers. 307 First and foremost, just as everyone could become disabled at any time (especially after the much more relaxed definition of disability under the ADA Amendments Act), everyone could be forced into a caregiving role at any time. 308 Even those workers who choose to never have children 309 might unexpectedly find themselves caring for a sick or disabled spouse, partner, parent, or other family member. Thus, all employees stand to benefit from a law that requires employers to provide flexibility to workers with caregiving responsibilities. 310 But even in the unlikely event a worker spends his entire career without having caregiving responsibilities, accommodating workers who do have those responsibilities benefits all employees. 311 Communitarian theory emphasizes the importance of the obligation and responsibility we have to individuals within our communities. " [C] ommunitarians believe that one of the most important communities to which we belong is our families," which is where we learn moral values. 314 Etzioni believes that there is a parenting deficit in society today, which he blames on both parents working too much and spending too little time at home. 315 He believes that children need attention and that both parents should be involved in their children's lives. 316 Other scholars emphasize the "fundamental morality of caregiving work, and the importance of such work to the sustenance of society." 317 Professor Laura Kessler states that we need to continually focus on the morality of caregiving because "caregiving work is fundamental to the functioning of society." 318 Some scholars, when referring to the importance of children, characterize children as a "public good." 319 Others argue that investing in children should be a national priority and caregiving is an "essential human function." 320 As communitarian theory teaches us, parenting and other caregiving is not simply a choice-it is a responsibility 321 -and caregivers' fulfillment of that responsibility benefits everyone. 322 Communitarian theory forces us to stop pitting caregivers against non-caregivers, and instead, teaches us that "there are other interests at stake-children, adult loved ones who need some care, and the communities to which they belong." 323 "Instead of viewing accommodations for parenting [and other caregiving] as only benefitting the [families], communitarian theory helps us to understand that we all benefit from parents' choice to procreate; after all, society needs procreation to [sustain itself,] and employers need procreation to continue to have employees in the *1150 future." 324 "Accordingly, caretaking labor creates a societal debt, which binds each and every member of society, not only individual family members." 325 Furthermore, communitarians assert that everyone lives with the consequences of children who are not brought up well and who then terrorize communities through misconduct and crime. 326 Studies indicate that those children who spent too much time taking care of themselves are more likely to engage in risky behavior, such as controlled substance abuse, and are more likely to have anger management problems, all of which could affect other people. 327 Others argue that "high parental involvement" (especially during adolescence) "can significantly help build self-esteem and educational accomplishment." 328 Accordingly, communitarian theory supports my proposal to provide reasonable accommodations to workers with caregiving responsibilities. 329 If we can convince employers and coworkers that raising children well means that parents occasionally need accommodations from the normal workplace norms in order to meet their caregiving responsibilities, we should be able to minimize the resentment that accompanies those accommodations. 330 "Above all, what we need is a change in orientation by both parents and workplaces." 331 "Child raising is important, valuable work, work that must be honored rather than denigrated by both parents and the *1151 community." 332 As one author aptly states: "These are children, our collective future." 
Logistics of Accommodating Caregiving
Of course, explaining the importance of accommodating employees with caregiving responsibilities does not explain how to implement and enforce such an accommodation mandate. Should an accommodation mandate be an open-ended reasonable accommodation provision similar to the ADA, or is it possible to draft an accommodation mandate that includes very specific, detailed rules designed to cover all caregiving-related accommodations? 334 Although I think it is possible to draft a workplace law that would provide all of the accommodations working caregivers need, I agree with others that such a proposal would be highly complex and even unwieldy. 335 Professor Arnow-Richman points to the military leave amendments to the FMLA as an example of a statute and regulations that are very detailed, but apply only to a very small portion of the population and provide only leaves of absence. 336 She asserts that an attempt to draft a law that would apply to all caregivers and all accommodations would prove very difficult. 337 I agree. It would be challenging to craft rules that would avoid legal uncertainty. 338 Therefore, such a statute would create a high risk of litigation and make employer compliance costly. 339 Thus, I think the best option is to borrow from the open-ended reasonable accommodation mandate and undue hardship defense 340 under the *1152 ADA.
Borrowing from the ADA, and making explicit that the drafters should define terms similarly to the ADA, will be made easier as more and more courts are forced to address reasonable accommodation questions now that the ADA Amendments Act broadened the protected class under the ADA.
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Obviously, some of the logistics of such an accommodation mandate would have to be worked out, and doing so is beyond the scope of this Article. At a minimum, such an accommodation mandate should allow caregivers to successfully manage work and family without fear of termination or the marginalization of their careers.
Conclusion
This Article explored two groups of employees that seemingly have little in common-individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. Despite some obvious differences, these groups share one common bond-their marginalization in the workplace. They face marginalization because of their inability to meet the ideal worker norm and the special-treatment stigma that follows from that inability. Although one can argue that the differences between these two groups warrant the different levels of protection the law provides, these differences break down once explored and unpacked. Thus, because the special-treatment stigma both groups experience overshadows the differences between the groups, this Article explored ways to end the mutual marginalization of both groups of employees. Specifically, it argued that embracing a communitarian philosophy with regard to workplace flexibility and workplace accommodations (for both individuals with disabilities and for caregivers) can help us see the benefits that providing accommodations can have, not just for employees seeking those accommodations, but for coworkers, employers, and society. Acting accordingly, we can hopefully end the marginalization of both groups of employees.
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